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I
n many respects, the 1980s appear to be the
worst decade in banking since the Great
Depression, while the 1990s could be rated
as the best. Over 1,100 commercial banks failed
orneededFDICassistanceduringthe1980s,and
significant parts of the thrift industry became
insolventandhadtoberesolved,costingtaxpay-
ers $125 billion. In contrast, the banking indus-
try began a dramatic recovery in the first half of
the 1990s and has recently achieved record prof-
itability,extremelylowlevelsofloanlosses,and
the highest capital ratios since the early 1940s.
As a result, the number of banks failing during
the second half of the 1990s has averaged only
four or five per year.
These two divergent experiences raise the
question of what will happen during the next
decade. One obvious forecast would be for
recent favorable trends to continue, particularly
since banks and the underlying economy have
shown remarkable strength and resiliency in
their recovery from the 1980s. The current envi-
ronment is not without some concerns, however.
Consumer debt has reached record levels, and a
few sectors, such as agriculture, show signs of
weakness.Also,banksupervisorshaverecently
voiced concerns that bank credit standards are
weakening. Moreover, the financial environ-
ment is changing rapidly with innovation, bank
expansion and consolidation, and competition
from new sources, thus opening the door for
new problems.
What will happen next in the banking indus-
try? This article examines the outlook for the
banking industry over the next few years,
focusing on whether the prosperity and tran-
quility of the 1990s will continue, or whether
the industry faces a return of the banking
problems of the 1980s. Because banks are in
much better shape now than in the 1980s, the
industry is unlikely to face the depth of prob-
lems suffered in the 1980s even if the economic
environment becomes less favorable. Still, it
appears that banks will be hard pressed to
match their recent record performance.
Thefirstsectionofthisarticlegivesafinancial
overviewofthecrisisofthe1980sandtherecov-
ery of the 1990s. The following sections com-
pare and contrast the 1980s and 1990s in three
areas:themacroeconomy,majorindustrysectors
and borrowers, and the banking industry and its
lending performance. Based on this historical
comparison, the final section discusses the most
likelyoutcomeforbankinginthecomingyears.
Kenneth Spong is a senior economist and Richard J.
Sullivan is an economist in the Banking Studies and Struc-
ture Department of the Division of Bank Supervision and
Structure at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. This
article is on the banks web site at www.kc.frb.org.I. CRISIS AND RECOVERY IN U.S.
BANKING
Over the past two decades, the U.S. banking
industry has taken the proverbial roller coaster
ride.Banksinthe1980ssufferedthemostsevere
problems since the Great Depression. In fact,
significant portions of the industry were at the
forefront of virtually every economic and finan-
cial crisis of the decade, involving energy, agri-
culture, real estate, and commercial and LDC
(less developed country) lending. Bank lending
inthe1980shelpedfosteraboom-bustcyclethat
wentwellbeyondthebasiceconomicfundamen-
tals in these areas, with each cycle typically end-
ing with substantial lending losses and
widespread banking failures. The 1990s have
witnessed nearly the opposite outcomea dra-
matic recovery followed by several years of
record or near-record performance. This sec-
tion reviews the general environment of the
1980s and 1990s and the major events that
define each period.
The 1980s: A period of crisis
The1980srepresentedasharpdeparturefrom
the previous 50 years. After the Great Depres-
sion, there were no serious banking problems
over the next few decades. Bank failure rates
were consistently low from the 1940s through
the 1970s, and only in a few years did the num-
beroffailuresexceedten(Chart1).Thispicture
then changed significantly during the 1980s.
More than 1,100 commercial banks failed or
received federal financial assistance, represent-
ingnearly8percentofallbanksoperatingatthe
beginning of the decade.
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Chart 1
NUMBER OF U.S. COMMERCIAL BANK FAILURES
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and were seldom resolved in a timely manner.
Over900thriftsfailed,representing17.5percent
of all thrifts operating at the start of the decade.
Moreover, many of these thrifts continued to
operate while insolvent, due to the lack of insur-
ance funds to resolve their problems. Roughly
one of every five thrifts in operation during the
1980s was actually insolvent, with these insol-
vent institutions holding more than 30 percent of
the thrift asset base.
The1980salsousheredinaneweraoffinancial
innovation and experimentation in debt markets.
Junk bonds, leveraged buyouts, commercial paper,
money market mutual funds, derivatives, and
asset securitization are just a few of the financial
instruments and activities that became popular.
These new financial instruments and expansion
by nonbank institutions created greater competi-
tion for banks and greatly expanded access to
credit for certain groups. Deregulation and the
removal of many product restrictions and geo-
graphic barriers in banking and other financial
services also played a major role in driving the
credit boom and collapse of the 1980s.
Another important aspect of the 1980s was the
presence of severe economic distress in certain
industry sectors and regions of the country.
Although the national economy remained sound
throughout much of the decade, excessive opti-
mism and subsequent debt problems were promi-
nent in a number of sectors, including agriculture,
energy production, real estate construction and
investment, and international lending.
The 1980s collapse in farming was set up by
booming agricultural conditions in the 1970s,
whencommodityprices,farmincomes,andfarm-
land values all reached record levels. Plunging
crop prices in the 1980s then set the stage for the
farm crisis. The U.S. Department of Agricultures
crop price index, for example, dropped 36 per-
cent. Sharply rising interest rates in the early
1980s also played a key role in bringing down
farmers that had pursued aggressive borrowing
strategies. Altogether, such problems led to the
failure of nearly 300 agricultural banks from
thelate1970stotheearly1990s(FDIC1997).
1
A similar pattern occurred in energy produc-
tion. The price of crude oil soared from around
$3abarrelintheearly1970stoapeakof$37in
1981, setting off a surge of energy exploration,
speculation, and lending. A drop in prices to
$10abarrelin1986thensetthestagefortheoil
patch crisis. The combination of collapsing oil
and agricultural prices was particularly devas-
tating to the Texas economy, where 425 banks
failed and nine of the ten largest bank holding
companies failed or had to be recapitalized in
the 1980s (FDIC 1997).
Real estate construction and investment fol-
lowed a similar boom and bust cycle during the
1980s. While part of this cycle can be traced to
initially favorable economic conditions in Cali-
fornia, Arizona, the Northeast, and the energy
states, other factors were also important. Finan-
cial deregulation and more favorable real estate
taxation in the early 1980s helped provide both
the funds and the incentives for a real estate
boom. The subsequent overbuilding and col-
lapse in real estate values, along with a tighten-
ing of tax policies in 1986, then resulted in the
thrift debacle and the failure of many banks,
including several large institutions.
One final troubling event for banks in the late
1970s and 1980s was the LDC debt crisis. LDC
lendinghadgrownrapidlyinthe1970sasmany
developing nations tried to finance more rapid
economic growth and cover increasing oil
pricesandrisinginterestratesondollar-denom-
inated debt.
2 Major U.S. banks were also using
overseas expansion and LDC lending in the
1970s as new profit opportunities in wake of
increasing competition in their traditional lend-
ing markets. The final trigger to the LDC crisis
was the very high level of U.S. interest rates in
the early 1980s, coupled with a slowdown in
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this crisis forced them to restructure and take
significant write-downs on their LDC loans.
Although no major bank failed because of LDC
lending, the profitability of large U.S. banks was
depressed throughout the 1980s.
The 1990s: Recovery and record
performance
The events of the 1990s stand in stark contrast
to those of the 1980s. The banking industry had
to work its way through several leftover prob-
lems in the early part of the decade, but the
remainder of the decade has been one of the best
ever for banks.
The banking industry was slow to recover from
the 1980s. Initially, banks faced the 1990-91
recession and a continued collapse in overbuilt
real estate markets. Another early stumbling
block was the credit crunch, during which loan
demand fell and banks became more cautious in
an attempt to improve credit quality. From 1990
to 1993, 407 commercial banks failed.
Since 1994, the banking industrys perfor-
mancehasreboundedandclimbedtoremarkable
heights. Only 31 commercial banks failed from
the beginning of 1994 through the third quarter
of 1999. For most of this period, bank profitabil-
ity has been at or near record levels, while credit
problems have been minimal.
In addition, banks have shown much greater
resiliency to sectoral economic problems in the
1990s. Despite recent downturns in several sec-
tors, banks have yet to fall victim to the types of
problems that plagued the industry in the 1980s.
In agriculture, the USDAs crop price index has
fallen by roughly 30 percent over the last three
years, which compares closely to the 36 percent
decline in the 1980s. While more time may be
needed to see the full effects of lower farm prices,
most agricultural banks are still doing well. In the
energy sector, crude oil prices plunged nearly 55
percent from the beginning of 1997 to early
1999a decline similar to that of the 1980s
(Petroleum Marketing Monthly). Few banks,
though,havesufferedseriousharmfromthis,in
part because oil prices have since recovered,
but also because most oil patch banks are far
more diversified than before. The recent Asian
financial crisis also has some similarities to the
LDC loan problems of the 1980, but unlike
then, major U.S. banks have largely avoided
foreign lending concentrations and have seen
little effect on their credit quality.
The banking environment in the 1990s has
therefore been much different than in the 1980s.
There are a number of reasons for expecting
recent trends to continue, but there are also signs
that some aspects of the 1980s could return. A
closer look at the macroeconomy, individual
sectorsoftheeconomy,andthebankingindustry
during the 1980s and 1990s may help provide
better insight into the outlook for banking.
II. MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS
AND THEIR EFFECT ON
BANKING PERFORMANCE
A starting point in explaining the differences
in banking performance between the 1980s and
1990s is the health of the overall economy. In a
prosperous and growing economy, most bor-
rowers have the income and resources to meet
theirobligations.Ontheotherhand,inadeclin-
ing economy, bank borrowers may face reduc-
tionsinincomeandcouldstruggletomaketheir
debt payments.
One measure of economic conditionsthe
growth in real gross domestic productis similar
for both the 1980s and 1990s. Average annual
growth during the 1980s expansion was 4.2
percent compared to 3.5 percent for the 1990s
expansion period, with much of the difference
being due to a much faster start to the 1980s
expansion.
3 The expansions in both of these
periods are also similar in length. The 1990s
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1980s in length and trails only the 1960s expan-
sion as the longest in U.S. history (NBER).
Because of their similarity, these economic
trends shed little light on why banking perfor-
mance differed so dramatically in the 1980s
and 1990s. The rapid start to the 1980s expan-
sion might have been a factor behind some of
the speculation and the credit boom in this
period, but the continued prosperity does not
explain why serious banking problems devel-
oped. One possible link is that prosperity often
encourages people and businesses to become
highly optimistic and less cautious in their
financial behavior. To the extent this could be
true in the 1990s, any credit imbalances have
yet to show themselves.
Another key economic and financial variable
influencing banking conditions and the deci-
sions of bank borrowers is inflation. Inflation is
an important variable because it determines the
realvalueofloanrepaymentstobanksandthus,
at some point, is reflected in the nominal inter-
est rates banks charge on loans. Inflation rates
weremuchhigherandmorevolatileintheearly
1980s than in the 1990s (Chart 2). Inflation
climbed rapidly in the late 1970s and early
1980s, then dropped just as rapidly. Since the
mid-1980s, inflation has stayed relatively low.
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Chart 2
INFLATION AND SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES
United States, monthly
Notes:Theprimerateistherateonshort-termloanschargedbybanksfortheirhighestqualitycommercialborrowers,andisanaver-
age of daily rates, not seasonally adjusted. Inflation is measured by the percent change of the consumer price index for the preceding
12 months, seasonally adjusted.
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Inflation rateInflation directly affects interest rates, or the
costofborrowing.Inresponsetorisinginflation,
the prime interest rate soared in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. However, the adjustment of
interest rates to inflation often lagged behind the
inflation trends. Going into the 1980s, the prime
rate was close to the inflation rate, thus putting
therealinterestrate,ortheactualcostofborrow-
ing, near zero. In fact, the effective cost of bor-
rowing at this time was probably even below
zero for many borrowers, since interest pay-
ments were generally tax deductible. Efforts to
control inflation in the early 1980s soon led to
rapid increases in the prime rate and in the real
cost of borrowing. The volatility of interest rates
inthisperiodaddedtotheuncertaintyinborrow-
ing and lending decisions.
This interest rate environment provides one
possible explanation for the credit problems of
the 1980s. The low real interest rates of the
1970s greatly reduced the effective cost of credit
and gave bank customers and other borrowers a
strong incentive to increase their indebtedness.
As the real cost of borrowing rose dramatically
in the following years, these higher debt loads
then set the stage for debt repayment troubles
and,inturn,forbankcreditproblemsandfailures.
In addition, high interest rates in the early 1980s
left many thrifts insolvent, based on their hold-
ings of long-term loans granted at much lower
rates. In contrast, U.S. banks, thrifts, and their
customershaveexperiencedmuchgreaterstabil-
ityinrealborrowingcoststhroughoutthe1990s.
III. MAJOR INDUSTRY SECTORS AND
BORROWERS
Another key to understanding the differences
between the 1980s and 1990s is the financial
condition of different bank customer groups,
most notably businesses, farmers, the construc-
tionindustry,andconsumers.Theabilityofthese
customerstoprepareforandwithstandadversity
played an important role in determining banking
performance over the last two decades and will
be an important consideration for the future.
This section reviews a number of financial
measures for these economic sectors and exam-
ines how these measures are related to bank
performance in the 1980s and 1990s.
Corporate sector
Banks are an important source of short-term
funds for businesses. As a result, the condition
of banks should be influenced strongly by the
health of the corporate sector. This linkage
between bank and corporate prosperity helps
explain why the banking industry did much
betterinthe1990sthaninthe1980s.Ingeneral,
corporate debt expanded rapidly in the 1980s,
and corporations played a key role in the credit
boom and collapse of this decade. In the 1990s,
corporate borrowing has typically been more
restrained, and better corporate finances are
reflected in fewer bank credit problems.
How well businesses cope with adversity
depends on their ability to service bank debt and
otherfinancialobligations.Twokeymeasuresof
the ability of corporations to handle debt are the
relationships between debt and corporate earn-
ings and between debt and overall market value
as based on stock prices. A debt-to-earnings
ratio, for example, helps show whether busi-
nesses are generating enough earnings to repay
their obligations and justify current debt levels.
Debt-to-market equity ratios indicate how debt
compares to the valuation placed on corpora-
tions by the market.
During the mid-1980s, the ratio of debt to
corporate profits grew rapidly for nonfinancial
corporations (Chart 3). In fact, over the entire
1980s expansion, corporate debt grew on aver-
age more than 11 percent annually, while
after-taxprofitsincreasedatlessthan6percent.
Consequently, many businesses were left with
relativelyfewerresourcestorepayarisinglevel
of obligations. An eventual result of this trend
may have been the 1990-91 recession and the
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business sector had to curtail expansion plans,
cut back on existing operations, and take other
contractionary steps.
These debt and profit trends have largely
reversed themselves in the 1990s. Corporate debt
in relation to earnings has fallen or remained
steady throughout most of the 1990s and has gen-
erally been below the levels achieved during the
1980s. In percentage terms, corporate debt has
increased just 6 percent annually, while corporate
profits have risen at more than twice that rate.
This turnaround presumably reflects successful
efforts to cut costs, take advantage of technologi-
calprogress,andmeetgrowinglevelsofdomestic
and foreign competition.
These figures suggest that most businesses in
the 1990s have been more able to handle their
debts than they were in the 1980s. A concern,
though, is that corporate debt recently appears
to be increasing in relation to profits. On an
aggregate basis, corporate profits are flattening
out, while the growth in debt is beginning to
accelerate at a pace reminiscent of the 1980s.
Debt-to-market equity ratios also suggest
greater debt problems in the 1980s. This ratio
has fallen significantly during the 1990s,
reflecting in part a rapidly rising stock market.
The market value of the corporate sector thus
appears to be supplying more support to corpo-
rate borrowings in the 1990s as compared with
the 1980s. Even a substantial market correction
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Chart 3
MEASURES OF DEBT CARRYING CAPACITY
FOR U.S. NONFINANCIAL CORPORATIONS
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds.
Debt/market equity Debt/after-tax profits
















25 1would still leave debt-to-market equity ratios in
much better shape than in the 1980s.
4
Overall, corporate businesses in the 1990s
appear to have done a better job of controlling
debt and maintaining their profitability and mar-
ket value. In some ways, the decade of the 1980s
mayhavebeenuniqueintermsofitscreditboom
and collapse. A variety of new debt instruments
became popular then, and the inflationary envi-
ronment of the previous decade, along with the
popularity of leveraged buyouts, helped encour-
age businesses and investors to favor the use of
debt markets over equity markets. Since then,
many changes have occurred in the economy. In
particular, relatively low interest rates and
healthy profit trends are serving to make current
debt levels more manageable than in previous
years. This favorable picture appears to have
provided a strong underpinning for the banking
industry,assumingcorporateborrowingdoesnot
accelerate over the next few years and corporate
profits continue to be strong.
The agricultural sector
Banks also play a critical role in financing the
agricultural sector. Consequently, farm industry
finances are often closely correlated with the
health of many rural banks. This relationship
wasmostobviousinthe1980swhenfarmersand
rural bankers suffered through one of the most
severe agricultural downturns in U.S. history.
Farming conditions have generally improved in
the 1990s. While prices for grain and livestock
haverecentlyfallen,thesedeclineshaveyettobe
felt significantly by banks.
A key step in comparing farm finances in the
1980s and 1990s is to examine debt levels in
farming and the flexibility of farmers in manag-
ing their debts. Two measures of the debt carry-
ing capacity of U.S. farmers are debt-to-net cash
income ratios and debt-to-equity ratios. The first
ratio measures how much debt farmers have in
relation to the earnings they generateearnings
which provide the funds for covering interest
obligations and debt repayments. The second
ratio measures how well farmers keep debt lev-
els in line with the overall equity they maintain
in their farming operations.
Farmdebthasdeclinedsubstantiallysincethe
1980s in relation to both net cash income and
equity (Chart 4). For example, total farm debt
was nearly six times farm income in the early
1980s, but in the late 1990s has fallen to less
than half that amount. Also, average farm
debt-to-equityratioshavefallenfromalmost30
percentinthemid-1980stolessthan18percent
in 1998, leaving farmers less exposed to the
type of debt problems that plagued them and
their bankers in the 1980s.
Several other factors also point to better farm
finances in the 1990s. Interest rates are low and
have fluctuated far less than in the 1970s and
1980s. With low unemployment in many areas,
off-farm income has become an important and
stable source of financial support for many
farmers. In addition, most farmers are now fol-
lowing more conservative expansion policies.
In contrast to the last agricultural cycle, few
farm advisors are advocating that farmers bor-
row heavily to expand.
While the overall outlook in the 1990s has
beenrelativelymorefavorable,thisdecademay
be closing with some disturbing trends for
farmers and their bankers (Westcott and
Landes). A major share of the decline in
debt-to-equity ratios may be due to increasing
farmland values over much of the 1990s.
Should low commodity prices continue and
eventually deflate land prices, debt-to-equity
ratios could rise substantially. Also, competi-
tion from abroad has been increasing as devel-
oping countries adopt more advanced
agricultural techniques and other countries,
such as Brazil, find ways to open more land to
farming. Foreign competition could also keep
U.S. prices depressed if currencies in some of
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tional concern is that government support pay-
ments are scheduled to decline further under the
1996 farm legislation.
Thus, the trends in farm finances generally
reflect the economic problems of the 1980s and
the recovery in the 1990s. Debt was much higher
relative to farm income and equity in the 1980s,
which would help to explain many of the debt
problems and bank lending losses that arose dur-
ing the farm crisis. Since then, farmers and rural
bankers have generally avoided the speculative
attitudes that brought on the earlier problems.
Some long-term concerns remain, however, such
as how a continuation of low prices and a drawn-
out contraction could affect the farm economy
and the ability of farmers to repay bank loans.
Real estate conditions
Banks are major providers of funds for real
estate construction and interim financing. Also,
while much of the long-term financing for resi-
dential real estate now passes through the capi-
tal markets, banks still originate a sizable
portion of this debt and hold substantial
amounts of it on their own balance sheets. Real
estate lending activities were at the forefront of
many of the banking problems of the 1980s and
early 1990sa period during which the real
estate industry experienced one of its most pro-
nounced cycles in U.S. history. Since then, the
real estate industry has followed a much more
stablecourse,andbankshavesufferedfarfewer
problems in their real estate lending than in the
1980s.
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Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
.05 1During the 1980s, real estate construction and
investment proved to be extremely volatile seg-
ments of the economy, with soaring construction
activity in the first half of the decade, followed
by a sharp decline through 1991 (Chart 5). The
overbuilding associated with the peak construc-
tion years and the subsequent declines in prop-
erty values became a central element in the thrift
crisis. Banks with significant real estate lending
exposures during this period suffered heavy
losses and, in several notable cases, failed.
This real estate volatility stemmed from a
number of factors. First, rising interest rates had
depressed construction activity in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, and subsequent interest rate
declines helped spark a surge in new construc-
tion. Also, the 1981 tax changes allowed real
estate investors to begin using an accelerated
rate of depreciation for real property, thus help-
ing to create a speculative environment in com-
mercial real estate. The 1986 tax reforms
removedmanyofthesetaxshelterincentives,
however, and helped to send the industry into a
downward spiral. Other factors behind volatile
real estate conditions included the boom and
bust conditions in the energy industry, the end
of the New England economic miracle, the
easing of several real estate lending restrictions
for banks and thrifts, and a jump into commer-
cial real estate lending by problem and failing
thrift institutions. In response to these condi-
tions, a number of major banks that were active
in commercial real estate lending failed during
the 1980s and early 1990s in such areas as
Texas,otherenergystates,andNewEngland.
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Chart 5
ANNUAL VALUE OF NEW U.S. NONRESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS
























Source: U.S. Census Bureau.
1980Since 1992, nonresidential building and new
office construction have followed a steadier
pace. Other measures of real estate market con-
ditionsalsoappearmorefavorableforthe1990s.
While metropolitan office vacancy rates
approached 20 percent on a nationwide basis
during the 1980s real estate collapse, this
vacancy rate has recently dipped below 10 per-
cent (CB Richard Ellis). As a result, most new
commercial construction appears to be readily
absorbed by local markets.
A number of factors have contributed to the
more stable real estate conditions of the 1990s.
First, policymakers have been strongly commit-
ted to avoiding a repeat of the 1980s economic
environment,inwhichsignificantfluctuationsin
interest rates, inflation, and real estate taxation
contributed to real estate volatility. Also, a num-
ber of bank and thrift regulations, such as real
estate loan-to-value ratios and appraisal stan-
dards, have been reimposed or tightened in an
effort to prevent the type of lending problems
that arose in the 1980s. Other favorable factors
includeasounderthriftindustryinthe1990sand
increased market discipline as more real estate
financing shifts to the capital markets through
securitization, REITs, and other innovations.
Consequently, real estate markets and lending
are in much better condition now than in the
1980s. A few areas of concern remain, though,
such as selected markets with high vacancy
rates, other markets where much new construc-
tionisinprogress,andthelikelihoodthataneco-
nomic downturn could lead to higher vacancy
rates and lower property values.
Consumers
Consumers represent another important seg-
ment of the marketplace and customer base of
banks. Consumer spending, moreover, is a driv-
ing force behind U.S. economic growth and the
profitability of many banks. Both the 1980s and
the 1990s have seen significant growth and
expansion in consumer credit. Over both
decades, consumer credit has grown much
more rapidly than several corresponding mea-
sures of consumers debt repayment capacity.
In spite of this apparent deterioration in credit
quality, consumer debt has not resulted in any
significant banking problems in the 1980s or
1990s.
Consumer credit quality and its implications
for the banking industry can be judged by such
factorsasthevolumeandcostofconsumerdebt
inrelationtothepersonalincomeandnetworth
of consumers. For example, higher income,
higher net worth, and lower interest rates all
help increase a consumers ability to repay debt
and support spending.
The strong growth of consumer credit in the
1980s and 1990s has left consumers with a ris-
ing debt burden relative to their incomes (Chart
6). Household debt increased 11 percent annu-
ally in the 1980s expansion period and 6.6 per-
cent annually in the 1990s expansion. These
increasesindebtexceededthegrowthinhouse-
hold income over the same periods. Consumer
debt in relation to household net worth has also
risen throughout much of the 1980s and 1990s,
although a rapid growth in household net worth
in the second half of the 1990s has helped to
reverse this pattern.
Another indicator of household debt condi-
tions, consumer bankruptcies, also points to a
worseningofcreditqualityinthe1990s.Nearly
1.4 million consumers filed for bankruptcy in
1998. This number was more than four times
the highest annual rate reached in the first half
of the 1980s and more than twice that of any
single year in the 1980s (Chart 7). This dra-
maticincreaseinbankruptciesduringfavorable
economic conditions would seem to imply a
significant overuse of credit by many consum-
ers. Other factors, such as a declining stigma
attached to personal bankruptcy, may have also
played a role in the bankruptcy trends. For
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Chart 6













































Source: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.bankers and other consumer lenders, todays
high level of consumer bankruptcies raises the
question of how high the number of bankruptcy




AND A NEW REGULATORY
ENVIRONMENT
The banking industry has made a dramatic
recovery from the 1980s by virtually every mea-
sure of performance. Profitability has been at or
nearrecordlevels,capitalisatitshighestpointin
many years, and loan quality has improved sig-
nificantly. Anumber of factors may have played
animportantroleinthisresurgence.Asshownin
the previous sections, economic conditions have
been extremely favorable in the 1990s, and indi-
vidual industry sectors and bank customer
groupshavetypicallycontrolledtheirdebtlevels
and improved their earnings and overall
resources. In response to the problems of the
1980s, many banks have also attempted to
improve their risk management practices and
have become more diversified. In addition, the
regulatory framework has changed, partly as a
result of the previous problems, but also because
of ongoing and revolutionary developments in
the banking industry itself. This section dis-
cusses the changing performance of banks in the
1980s and 1990s and the possible factors behind
this improvement.
The condition of banks in the 1980s and the
1990scanbecomparedusinganumberofdiffer-
entmeasures,includingprofitability,capitalpro-
tection, and the volume and riskiness of lending
activities. Bank profitability has been much
higher in the 1990s than in the 1980s (Chart 8).
In fact, return on average assets for the entire
U.S. banking industry reached a record of 1.30
percent in 1997, nearly twice the typical level
achieved in the 1980s. These earnings differ-
encesreflectthevarietyofproblemsbanksfaced
during the 1980s expansion, including LDC
lending problems, the agricultural and energy
crises, and real estate overbuilding. In contrast,
U.S. banks have not faced any sustained prob-
lems in the 1990s, and such events as the Asian
financial crisis and the agricultural slowdown
haveyettohavemorethanamoderateeffecton
bank earnings.
In the 1990s, banks are also doing a better job
of maintaining and increasing capital. Since the
beginning of the decade, banks have gradually
built up their capital and now have equity capi-
tal ratios that are more than two percentage
points higher than in the 1980s (Chart 8). On an
industrywide basis, bank equity capital ratios
are now at their highest level since 1941. The
trend toward higher capital can be attributed to
such factors as better earnings in the 1990s,
fewer banking and economic problems, and
favorable conditions in equity markets.
Regulation, in the form of higher capital
requirements, has also played a major role. The
adoption of risk-based capital standards in the
late 1980s, followed by the prompt corrective
action capital guidelines in the early 1990s,
have given banks strong incentives to increase
their capital levels.
Nevertheless, while bank capital is important
in absorbing losses and supporting bank opera-
tions, it is not a perfect guarantee against seri-
ous problems. Many banks that failed in the
1980s began with healthy capital levels but
encountered severe downturns in their region.
Moreover, bank capital must now cover more
off-balancesheetactivitiesthaneverbeforeand
a possibly wider range of risks.
The next point of comparisonbanking
riskis of interest due to the problems many
banks encountered in the 1980s. The major risk
for most banks lies in their lending activities.
While it is difficult to measure and compare
risk exposures in bank lending, it is possible to
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lending relative to other banking activities, and
the amount of problem loans.
The focus of bank lending has experienced a
number of notable changes over the last two
decades.Fromthebeginningofthe1980sexpan-
sion to 1998, business lending fell from more
than 40 percent of the bank industrys total lend-
ing portfolio to less than 28 percent (Chart 9). At
the same time, real estate lending jumped from
under 26 percent of the overall loan portfolio to
41 percent. This increased real estate lending
involved both commercial and residential real
estate in the 1980s, but only residential real
estate has taken on a more prominent role in the
1990s. The shift away from business lending
reflects, in part, a movement by large, highly
rated corporations toward the use of commercial
paper and other credit market sources. The
increase in real estate lending to fill this void
suggests than bank lending may have become
morerisky,particularlywithregardtotheexpan-
sion of commercial real estate lending activities
in the 1980s. Consumer lending has maintained
much the same position in bank loan portfolios,
except for a slight increase in the mid-1990s.
Two other lending comparisons can be drawn
for the 1980s and 1990s using bank
loan-to-asset ratios and the level of problem
loans.Loan-to-assetratiosprovideonemeasure
of a banks potential exposure to credit quality
problems. Although a high loan-to-asset ratio
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Chart 8
PROFIT AND EQUITY CAPITAL FOR U.S. BANKS
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in response to new accounting practices.
Source: Reports of Condition and Income for banks.
Return on average assets
(left scale)
Equity capital/total assets
(right scale)by itself does not necessarily indicate credit
problems,severalstudieshavefoundthisratioto
be one of the best predictors of bank failures.
6
The loan-to-asset ratios of banks reached their
peak in the late 1980s and have remained lower
on average throughout the 1990s (Chart 10).
These differences, though, are fairly small and
might be explained in part by the increased use
of securitization as a means of moving loans off
the balance sheets of banks.
Noncurrent loans provide a more direct mea-
sureofloanquality.Banksnowhavemuchlower
levels of noncurrent loans than in the 1980s and
early 1990s (Chart 10). For instance, the
noncurrent loan ratio for 1998 was less than
one-third the typical ratio during the 1980s
expansion. This pattern also holds true for such
individualloancategoriesascommercialloans,
real estate loans, and agricultural loans (FDIC
1995-99). In each of these lending categories,
loan charge-off and delinquency rates have




loans now have charge-off rates above those
duringthe1980s,anddelinquencyratesonboth
credit card debt and other consumer loans have
been rising over the past few years. There are
alsootherindicationsthatbankconsumercredit
quality has deteriorated. Access to consumer
credit has expanded rapidly at banks, and
high-risk forms of consumer lending are gain-
ing greater prominence in bank portfolios as
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Source: Reports of Condition and Income for banks.
Consumer
Commercial real estatewell. For instance, credit card lines or unused
commitments have grown quickly at banks,
reaching a figure of more than $2 trillion in
1998a fourfold increase since the early 1990s
(FDIC1999).Banksarealsousingsecuritization
as a means of further increasing access to con-
sumercredit.Inaddition,asignificantnumberof
banks are jumping into riskier forms of lending,
such as subprime and high loan-to-value loans
(Saunders; DiNapoli and Greenspan).
The overall improvement in bank credit qual-
ity can be attributed to the lengthy economic
expansion of the 1990s and to the steps that
many bank borrowers have taken to improve
their earnings and control debt levels. At the
same time, though, many banks have also imple-
mented better risk management practices and
adopted new and better tools for measuring and
controlling risk. These include greater use of
internal credit rating systems, risk models, risk
limits and internal controls, and hedging activi-
ties. In addition, a significant portion of the
banking industry has become more diversified
as well, particularly on a geographic basis. Since
thestartofthe1980s,almostalloftheregulatory
barriers limiting bank expansion within states
andacrossstatelineshavefallen,thuspavingthe
wayforrapidgeographicexpansionandconsoli-
dation in the banking industry. Other changes
that may have contributed to improved credit
qualityincludenewloan-to-valueguidelinesand
appraisal standards in real estate lending, the
tightening of other regulatory provisions, better
discipline from investors and capital markets,
and the removal of failing thrift institutions from
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Chart 10
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By most measures of performance, banks have
improved substantially since the 1980s. Earn-
ings are now at or near record figures, and most
banks have capital levels that would provide
much support during a downturn. Banks also
have generally succeeded in managing credit
risk and bringing down their levels of loan
charge-offs and noncurrent loans. However,
these risk-management efforts have yet to be
tested in a severe downturn, and in some areas,
such as consumer lending, banks already show
signs of weakness.
V. OUTLOOK FOR THE U.S.
BANKING INDUSTRY
A key question in the outlook for the U.S.
banking industry is whether banks will continue
to perform as well as they have in the 1990s or
revert to another round of problems like those of
the1980s.Theanswertothisquestionislikelyto
dependongeneraleconomictrends,thehealthof
individual sectors of the economy, and the suc-
cessofbanksinrespondingtofuturechallenges.
The outlook for the banking industry will first
be influenced by the overall economy. The
macroeconomy was an important factor in the
strong performance of banks and many industry
sectors in the 1990s. To the extent that the econ-
omy continues its recent path and few sectors or
regions are left behind, the banking outlook
should generally correspond to that of the 1990s,
particularly if overoptimism and debt imbal-
ances can be avoided.
The economy could easily take another direc-
tion, though, especially since the current expan-
sion is already one of the longest on record. One
alternative pathrising inflation and interest
ratescould affect banks in several ways. Con-
sumer credit delinquencies would certainly
increase as the cost of credit rose, although most
consumers and banks appear to have the
resources to handle the resulting credit prob-
lems. A more serious problem might arise if
consumers were forced to curtail their spend-
ing,leadingtoabroaderbusinessdownturnand
declining corporate earnings. Rising interest
rates could also lead to a declining stock mar-
ket, which, in turn, could lower the net worth
and spending of consumers and the level of
business investment, further accentuating any
downturn.
A downturn led by cutbacks in consumer
spending would obviously result in notable
declines in corporate and bank earnings and
increased failure rates. However, both the cor-
porate and banking sectors appear to be better
prepared for this type of downturn than in pre-
vious years, based on current corporate debt
loads, bank capital levels, and better risk man-
agement practices in banking. Consequently,
unlessadownturnissevere,theoutcomewould
stillbemuchmorefavorablethaninthe1980s.
Regarding particular sectors or regions of the
economy that might prove to be a problem for
the banking industry in the future, two stand
outagriculture and the consumer sector. The
farm sector could continue to face lower com-
modity prices for several years, due to
increased foreign production and further
improvements in production technology. How-
ever,farminghasnotbeenhitbythesamespec-
ulative fever that brought on its collapse in the
1980s. Also, consolidation in farming and
betterfarmpracticesandfinancesareleadingto
more efficient farms that can adapt to and sur-
vive a variety of threats. Congressional appro-
priations have further helped to maintain farm
income and support farmland prices over the
last two years. This suggests that farmers and
agricultural banks may experience greater
problems than they have at any point in the
1990s, but they are unlikely to fall as far as they
did in the 1980s.
The consumer sector is a concern because of
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and high employment rates in the 1990s have
helped postpone any problems in this sector, but
the consequences of high debt levels may be dif-
ficult to avoid over the next few years. Many
consumers have adequate resources to support
their borrowing, but a growing number do not.
Household savings rates have fallen signifi-
cantly over the past few years, and much of the
growth in household net worth has come from a
rising stock market. For banks that serve a diver-
sified group of customers and have maintained
their credit standards, consumer lending is not
likely to pose a serious problem. However, for
otherswithlowerconsumerlendingstandardsor
aconcentrationinsubprimecredits,aneconomic
downturn and rising unemployment could cause
significant loan losses. Although such banks
may constitute only a small part of the banking
system, consumer credit problems could have a
much broader effect if consumer spending is sig-
nificantly curtailed and business profitability
declines.
The business and real estate sectors could also
have isolated problems, most notably if corpo-
rateearningsflattenoutordeclineandrealestate
markets do not closely match construction to
demand. It is conceivable that these potential
problems could become more severe and follow
a highly cyclical path. For example, current
prosperity could possibly lead to rapidly rising
optimism and overinvestment in either sector,
combined with excessive debt expansion. This
debt expansion, in turn, could set the stage for a
more severe decline. In general, though, these
two sectors have done a much better job of gen-
erating earnings, controlling debt, and avoiding
excessive optimism and overbuilding com-
pared with the 1980s. Consequently, both the
business and real estate sectors appear less
likely to experience a severe decline.
Overall, the potential problems facing banks
from the macroeconomy and from individual
sectors of the economy are unlikely to match
those of the 1980s. Banks will begin the next
decade with higher capital than in previous
years, far fewer credit troubles, and record
earnings levels. As a result, the banking indus-
try should be in a better position to deal with
any problems that might occur. These factors
therefore suggest that bank performance over
the next few years is unlikely to mirror that of
the 1980s.
At the same time, though, banks may find it
difficult to keep up the pace of the last few
years. Economic conditions, interest rates, and
other factors are unlikely to remain as favor-
able.Apartfromtheirtraditionallendingactivi-
ties, banks will also face a host of new
challenges over the next decade, including fur-
ther banking consolidation, growth in elec-
tronic banking, greater competition from
nonbank sources, the merging of banking with
the securities and insurance industries, new
financial instruments, and the need to manage
risks more closely in this rapidly changing
environment. The success of banks in dealing
with these challenges will play a large role in
how well banks do in the future.
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1 In these bank failure statistics, agricultural banks are
defined as those in which agricultural loans make up at least
25 percent of total loans and leases.
2 For more information on the LDC debt crisis and its effect
on large U.S. banks, see FDIC 1997.
3 Many of the charts in this section will make comparisons
overthe1980sand1990sexpansionperiods.Sincethe1980s
expansion began with the first quarter of 1983 and the 1990s
expansion began with the second quarter of 1991, the years
1983and1991willbeusedasthestartingpointsforcompar-
ing these two periods.
4 Corporate debt-to-net worth ratios, which relate debt obli-
gationstothevolumeofunencumberedresourcessupporting
the debt, show a different trend during the 1990s than the
other debt measures. For nonfinancial corporations, the
aggregate debt-to-net worth ratio rose throughout the
1980s. However, unlike the other measures, this ratio con-
tinuedtoincreaseintheearly1990sandhassinceremained
above the levels achieved in the 1980s. While this debt
relationship is not consistent with the greater financial
problems that corporations encountered in the 1980s, it
couldindicatethatbusinessesarebecomingmoreadeptin
their use of resources, capital, and risk management prac-
tices.
5 A more detailed description of the real estate collapse of
the 1980s and its effect on banks and thrifts can be found in
FDIC 1997.
6 For examples of such studies, see Belongia and Gilbert
1990 and FDIC 1997.
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